Abstract-Tbis paper develops an equilibrium theory for two-person two-criteria stocbastic decision problems with static information patterns, wherein the decision makers (DM'S) have different probabilistic models of tbe underlying process, the objective functionals are quadratic, and the decision spaces are general inner-product spaces. Under two different modes of decision making (viz. symmetric and asymmetric), sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium solutions (stable in tbe former case), and in eacb case a uniformly convergent iterative scheme is developed whereby the equilibrium policies of the DM's can be obtained by evaluating a number of conditional expectations. When tbe probability measures are Gaussian, the equilibrium solution is linear under the symmetric mode of decision making, whereas it is generically nonlinear in the asymmetric case, with tbe linear structure prevailing only in some special cases which are delineated in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
A TEAM is defined as a group of agents who work together in a coordinated effort, in a possibly hostile and uncertain environment, in order to achieve a common goal. In achieving this goal, the members of the team do not necessarily acquire the same information, and hence they have to operate in a decentralized mode of decision making. The scientific approach to formulation and analysis of team problems has involved 1) a quantification of the underlying common goal in the form of a (mathematical) objective function which is sought to be optimized jointly by the agents, and 2) a modeling of the uncertain environment and the possible measurements made by the agents on this environment in the form of a probability space together with an appropriate information structure [ 141, [7] , [ 151, [ 161. The underlying stipulation here has been the existence of a probability space that is common to all the agents, so that through their priors all members of the team "see the world" in exactly the same way.
One question that readily comes into mind at this point is the robustness of such a mathematical model, and the "optimum" solutions it produces, to slight variations in the underlying assumptions. In particular, what if the agents perceive the outside world in slightly different ways? Would the solution obtained under the assumption of common prior probability measures change drastically if there are discrepancies in the agents' perceptions of the probabilistic description of the outside world? In order to be able to answer these queries satisfactorily and effectively, we need a theory of equilibrium for decision problems in which the decision makers (DM's) have different probabilistic models of the system; such a general theory will clearly subsume Manuscript received December 20, 1982; revised September 28, 1983 .
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Consider a static team decision problem, formulated in the standard manner as in 171, with the only difference being in the underlying probability space. In particular, assume that the DM'S assign different subjective probabilities to the uncertain events, in which case there will not exist a common probability space, thereby leading to a different expected (average) cost function for each DM. Hence, once we relax the assumption of existence of a common probability space, the team problem is no longer a stochastic optimization problem with a single objective functional, and we inevitably have to treat it as a nonzero-sum stochastic game [5], [SI, [12] . Furthermore, even though the original team decision problem with a common probability space will admit the same team-optimal solution(s) regardless of the mode of decision making (that is, regardless of whether the roles of the DM's are symmetric or whether there is a hierarchy and dominance in decision making), this feature ceases to hold true when there exists a discrepancy between the perceived probability measures. When there are only two members, for example, two possibilities emerge in the presence of discrepancies: the totally symmetric roles, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium solution, and the hierarchical mode, corresponding to the Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
Motivated by these considerations, we treat in this paper a more general (than team) class of two-person stochastic decision problems which can be viewed as static stochastic nonzero-sum games with the DM'S having different subjective probability measures. Adopting both the symmetric and asymmetric modes of decision making, we develop in each case a general theory of equilibrium when the objective functionals are quadratic and the decision spaces are appropriate Hilbert spaces. Such a formulation includes both finite-dimensional (discrete) and continuous-time decision problems, and involves arbitrary probability measures which are, though, restricted a posteriori by the conditions of existence and uniqueness developed in this paper. The special case of Gaussian distributions is studied in considerable depth, and some explicit solutions are obtained with appealing features.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a precise problem formulation, and introduces the two solution concepts adopted in the paper. Section III develops general conditions for existence and uniqueness of a stable equilibrium solution under the symmetric mode of decision making, and elucidates the extent of the restrictions imposed on the problem by these conditions. Section IV presents a counterpart of the results of Section I11 under the asymmetric mode of decision making, with the mathematical machinery used being inherently different from that of Section III. Section V deals with the special class of Gaussian distributions, under both symmetric and asymmetric modes of decision making. In the former case it is shown that the unique stable equilibrium solution is affine in the measurements and can be obtained explicitly. In the latter case, however, the solution is generically nonlinear, and contains summation of terms which involve products of linear functions of measurements with OO18-9286/85/0200-0118$01 .OO 0 1985 IEEE exponential terms (whose exponents are quadratic in the measurements). The section also contains some discussion on finitedimensional and continuous-time problems, treated as special cases. Section VI is devoted to discussions'on possible extensions of these results in different directions, provides some interpretation of the general approach and results, and includes some concluding remarks. The paper ends with five Appendices which include results used in the main body of the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION AND SOME BASIC RESULTS

A . Probability Spaces
Let Q = Rfl X Rml X W m 2 4 X X Yl X Y2, 63 denote the Borel field of subsets of 0, and CBk denote the Borei field of subsets of ak, k = n, m,, m2. Let 6 denote the set. of all probability measures on (Q, a) with finite second moments, and for each P E 6 denote the corresponding marginal measures on an, and am2 by P,, P,,, and Py2, resoectively. Furthermore, let the collection of all such-probability measures be denoted by S , , PU,, and SY2, respectively. Then, for each P E 6 , the vector z = ( x ' , y ] ' , y 2 ' ) ' ;
taking values in Q , becomes a well-defined random vector on (Q, 63, P), and likewise x is a random vector on (Zn, a", P,) andyi is a random vector on (3mi, a m i . P J .
HereI'x denotes the unknown state of nature, and yi denotes an observation of DMi (ith decision maker) which is correlated with X. We now choose two elements out of 6, P' and P2, which denote the subjective probabilities assigned to t by DM1 and DM2, respectively. For technical reasons, we place some further restrictions on the choices of PI and P2 through the marginals Pi;; in particular, we assume the following.
Condition I : Pj. and P:, are absolutely continuous [ l ] with respect to and respectively; that is, using the standard notation in probability theory
is uniformly bounded a.e. Pf;, i = 1, 2.
The necessity of these two conditions in the formulation of our problem will be made clear in the sequel. We should note, however, that for the special case when PI is equivalent to P2, both of these conditions are satisfied (in the latter case the bound is equal to 1) and we have the standard decision theoretic framework 121 with a single probability space.
B. Decision and P o k y Spaces
The decision variable of DMi will be denoted by ui which belongs to a real separable Hilbert space Vi with inner product (. , Lemma I : ri is a Hilbert space.
0
Lemma 2: If Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, every element of ri has bounded second-order moments also under P$, j # i.
C. Cost Functionals
Let D,$V, .+ V,{i # j , i, j = 1, 2) be strongly positive I bounded linear operators, and Fj:X + V, be bounded linear operators for all i , j = 1, 2. Furthermore, let Eihi(z)lyi] denote the mathematical expectation of a z-measurable random variable pi(z} taking values in U, conditioned on the random variable yi, and under the probability measure Pi, i.e., where the second term of the integrand is the conditional probability measure derived from Pi. Then, for each pair (yl, y2) E TI x r2, we have a quadratic expected cost functional for each
every term of which can be shown to be finite, in view of Lemmas 1 and 2. Note that in the absence of Conditions 1 and 2, J, is not necessarily finite, and hence the problem is not well defined.
It is worth mentioning here that Ji describes a most general type of quadratic cost functional which is strictly convex in ui, and that the formulation here covers also the cases of team problems (Djj = I , Df2 .= D$T,* F! = e, i, j = 1, 2, i # J ) and zero-sum
But even in these "single loss-functional" problems, the DM'S will have inherently different expected cost functions whenever P' and P2 are different, since then a common probability space does not exist. This forces us to formulate the problem as a multicriteria optimization problem and introduce equilibrium solution concepts that would be appropriate in this framework.
D. Equilibrium Solution Under the Symmetric Mode of Decision Making
Since the expected cost functions (6), together with the policy spaces, provide a normal (strategic) form description, regardless of the presence of multiple probability measures, the standard definition of noncooperative (Nash) equilibrium [5] remains intact, which is the most reasonable solution concept here under the symmetric mode of decision making. 
0
Remark I : The notion of stable equilibrium makes particular sense (and is of paramount importance) in decision problems wherein the DM'S have different priors on the uncertain quantities because it is determined as the outcome of a natural iterative process. In this process, each DM responds optimally (using his priors) to the most recent decision (policy) of the other DM, with the priors on which this decision is based being irrelevant. In other words, even though the computation of the Nash equilibrium solution will depend on the different prior probability measures perceived by two DM'S, in the iterative procedure that leads to this equilibrium each DM has to know only his own prior and the other one's announced policy at the previous step. For an earlier utilization of this concept in a deterministic setting we refer the reader to [28] .
E. Equilibrium Solution Under an Asymmetric Mode of
Decision Making
In the case of the asymmetric mode there is a hierarchy in decision making, which permits one DM (say DM1-leuder) to announce and enforce his policy on the other DM (follower). The relevant solution concept here is the leader-follower (Stackelberg) solution which is introduced below. We now obtain some general conditions for existence of stable equilibrium solutions under the symmetric mode of decision making, and also consider some special cases when the probability measures of both DM'S are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (i.e., when densities exist). First, we have the following. 
17
By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 1, relations (9a) and (9b) 
Now, substituting (13b) into (13a), and also (13a) into (13b), by appropriately matching the superscripts, we arrive at the following two recursive relations: Lemma 2 ) . Furthermore, let us introduce the notation ((S)); to denote the norm of a linear bounded operator S T i + I?,, which is defined by and both of which map ri into itself (the former also maps i J j into itself). Then, the following proposition, whose proof depends on a contraction mapping argument (see Appendix B), provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the unique equilibrium solution alluded to in Proposition 2.
Theorem I :
i) Under Conditions 1 and 2, the decision problem of Section II admits a unique stable Nash equilibrium solution given by (15) 
ii) A set of sufficient conditions for (19) where 11 * 1 1 ; denotes the operator norm on Vi, as a counterpart of (17a).
Proof: S e e Appendix B. 0
Part ii) of Theorem 1 provides a partial separation (in terms of sufficient conditions) of the deterministic and stochastic parts of the system. Now, if the decision problem is a team problem with a common loss functional (which requires DL = I , Dl2 = D $ f , Ft = E , and Fj = E), and if team cost is strictly convex in the pair ( u l , u2) (which is true if and only if IID12Df$lII = p < l), it follows that the first inequality holds with pi = p : < 1. If, furthermore, the subjective probability measures-assigned to the pair ( y l , y 2 ) by the two DM'S are equivalent, Pili becomes the product of two projection operators, thus leading to satisfaction of the second inequality in (20b) with p l = p ; = 1, and thereby to satisfaction of (20a). Hence, as a corollary to the second part of Proposition 3, we obtain the following result which is known in different contexts [7]-[9] .
Corollary I: For the strictly convex quadratic team problem with equivalent subjective probability measures assigned by the two DM'S to ol, y2), there exists a unique stable equilibrium solution (the so-called team-optimal solution), irrespective of the underlying common probability measure.
0
For team problems with P I 4 P2, a result along the lines of Corollary 1 does not in general hold because the operator Pili is not necessarily the product of two projection operators. Then, the general condition is (19) [or the stronger one, (20a)J which places some restrictions on the parameters of the cost functional, as well as the probability measures P 1 and P2. To delineate the extent of these restrictions, we now study the second inequality of (20b) somewhat further and obtain the following sufficient condition.
Corollary 2: For a given p i , the second inequality of (20b) is satisfied if the expression
~; C V ; ) E ' [~~C Y~) I Y ; I =
is uniformly bounded from above by a.e. Pij. Furthermore, if the probability measures P' and P 2 are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, this condition can be expressed equivalently in terms of the probability densities p i ( y i , y j ) as follows:
Y,
Proof: For (21a) see Appendix C; (21b) follows readily from (2 1 a).
, since here Pi is allowed to be different from Pf, although still a 3 This result is slightly more general than the related ones that can be found restriction is imposed on these (indirectly) via the equivalence between Pj.,a and P:,,,,,.
Iv. GENERAL SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR A STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
We now turn our attention to the asymmetric mode of decision making, obtain some general sufficient conditions for existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium solution, and provide a complete characterization of the solution. Subsequently, we consider some special cases with some further structure imposed on the cost functionals and the probability measures.
First, we obtain an expression for DM2's unique reaction T2:rl + I'2, as defined by (lo), using Proposition 1
Hence, the derivation of the leader's Stackelberg policy 7 ; E rl involves [in view of (1 l)] the minimization of JI over rl after y$ given by (22) is substituted in. This substitution yields
xx Y* +F;E2rxlY21, FM2 P I (dx, Y , , d t )
where we have deleted the subscript 1 in y, in grder to simplify the notation. Now,.since rI is a linear space, and J i s the sum of terms homogeneous of degree zero, one, and two (maximum), any minimizing solution y E rl will have to satisfy
where S;J(y; h ) is the Gateaux variation of J(y) of degree i.4
Extensive manipulations, details of which-are give? in Appendix D lead to the following expressions for 6J and 62J:
.
E2[h(E)I~211~~I)~P:, ( d~~) -( h ,
D I z D S I P I~I~)~ (26)
where Z:rl + rl and p E rl are defined by
U1 is a linear operator given by
U1 is the space of y,-measurable random variables taking values in Or,, and g'([) are the R-N derivatives (2). Note that PI(, is related to P I , , defined by (18b) by
where the latter (which is a mapping from rl into r,) has been used in (26) and will also be used in the sequel whenever needed. Now, since (24) is also equivalent to 
Since the first of these conditions does not depend on y, the optimal solution is solely determined by (30), which can be rewritten as where we have utilized the fact that the adjoint of 611L is a linear operator 6 f i I :
Furthermore, condition i) can be rewritten as 
We now summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Under Conditions 1) and 2), the decision problem with multiple probability measures admits a Stackelberg equilibrium solution if, and only if, @ is nonnegative definite and (31) admits a solution in TI. 0 Equation (31) will, in general, not admit a closed-form solution, even if all random variables are jointly Gaussian distributed (see Section V-C); therefore, we will have to resort to numerical computations which w i l l involve a recursion of some type. Hence, in analyzing the conditions of existence of a solution to (31) we may also require that such a numerical scheme be globally convergent (or stable). One appealing scheme whereby a unique solution to (31) [or equivalently, (30)] can be obtained is the recursion where ys E rl is the limit of the iterative scheme ( 3 3 , and Tz is the affine operator (22).
0
We now further elaborate on (36), so as to bring it to a form which separates out the contributions from the deterministic and probabilistic components of the problem. (Here, we are seeking sufficient conditions which would constitute the counterpart of (20) in this context). Towards this end, let us first note that using (34) in (25a) where the equality follows because i) the spectral radius and norm of a self-adjoint linear operator are equal [ 13, p. 5141, ii) norm of a "nonself-adjoint" linear operator X is equal to the square root of the spectral radius of the self-adjoint operator 3PX (see Appendix A, Lemma A.1). Finally, using the result of Lemma A.2 (Appendix A), the latter is bounded from above by show that the given three conditions subsume (33), i.e., nonne-
gativity of operator a. We now verify that Condition 3 in fact implies that @ is a strongly positive operator. First note that a is
self-adjoint because X commutes with D:TD&JD:~. Hence, using Lemma A.3 (Appendix A), we can write down the inequality and T2 is given by (22).
Remark 3: When the original problem is a Stackelberg game, but the probability measures are identical, a study of the original r ( e -9 )~-r (~~~~~2~~l (~+~~) ) + r (~~2~~1 P l~l condition (36) reveals the inequality 1 2 +DlTDfz*P$I). r(Z) I r(DlZD2, + D:fDlf -DtTDj2Dtl) I p < 1.
Then, using the line of arguments that led to (38) from (37), and the spectral radius inequality for the product of two self-adjoint operators, we obtain the bound This is the existence condition associated with the standard stochastic Stackelberg game, which corroborates the earlier result obtained in [25] .
We now conclude this section by presenting the counterpart of 1 Corollary 2 in the present conkxi, which-provides a -set of r(a -9) 15 r(D3fDj2Djl)~(X +X*) (simpler) sufficient conditions for (40b) to be satisfied.
Corollary 4 Thus, r(a -9) i p3p4 + p1p2 < 1, implying that the spectrum of the self-adjoint operator -9 is uniformly in the unit sphere.
Hence, @ is strongly positive. where pI can be taken to be less than one. Hence, (39) reads (2P2 + P4) < 1 Ifi.
(42)
We now summarize these results as a corollary to Theorem 2 .
Coroifary 3: Under Conditions 1 and 2 of Section I1 and (42) given above, the strictly convex quadratic team problem, with multiple probability measures and asymmetric mode of decision making, admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution (*I", T,[yq), where ys E rl is the limit of the iterative scheme (35) with Proof: For (43a), (43b) see Appendix C; (44a), (44b), however, follow readily from (43a), (43b).
V. JOINTLY GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTIONS
In decision and control theory, one appealing class of probability distributions is the Gaussian distribution because it leads to tractable problems admitting, in most cases, closed-form solutions. Indeed when the probabilfty measures of the two DM'S are identical and Gaussian, equilibrium solutions have been shown to be affine functions of the observations for 1) quadratic stochastic team problems defined on Euclidean spaces [7] , 2) quadratic stochastic Nash games on Euclidean spaces [8], 3) quadratic continuous-time stochastic team problems [9] , 4) quadratic stochastic Stackelberg games on Euclidean spaces [25], and 5) quadratic continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg games [26] . In this section, we investigate possible extensions of this appealing structural feature to the case when discrepancies exist between the subjective Gaussian distributions, as reflected in the covariances of the random vectors &, y2). We could also have included discrepancies in the perceptions of the mean values, but such a more general treatment does not contribute substantially to the qualitative nature of the results obtained in the sequel, and besides it makes the expressions notationally cumbersome. Interested readers may find relevant expressions for the nonzero mean case in [27] .
We first introduce notation and terminology, and delineate Conditions 1 and 2 of Section 11 (Section V-A). Then, we study the case of symmetric mode of decision making in Section V-B and show that the unique equilibrium solution of Theorem 1 is linear. Finally,in Section v -c we treat the case of asymmetric mode of decision making, and show that (in contradistinction with the result of Section V-B) the unique Stackelberg solution of Theorem 2 is generically nonlinear.
A . Notation and Terminology
Let (x, y l , y2) be zero-mean Gaussian random vectors under both PI and P z , with covariance ( y l , y2) = E;.
covariance (x, y1, y2) = cov (x, y ) = Xi
These probability distributions clearly satisfy the absolute continuity condition (Condition 1) of Theorems 1 and 2 . 
in terms of which we evaluate (21a) (using standard properties of Gaussian distributions) to be
We are now in a position to specialize the results of Theorems 1 and 2 to Gaussian distributions and obtain some explicit results.
B. Symmetric Mode of Decision Making
In order to apply Theorem 1 to the Gaussian decision problem formulated above, we first explore the satisfaction of various conditions given there. We have already shown above that Condition 1 is always satisfied and Condition 2 is satisfied whenever W; 2 0. For the remaining condition we study inequalities (20b). The second of these is satisfied, for a given p $ , if [using (21a)l expression (49) is uniformly bounded in y;, and this bound is no greater than p i . For uniform boundedness of (49) it is necessary and sufficient that under which the latter condition becomes 4;s (pi)'.
Hence, going back to (20a), the condition IlD:p,;llf< l/qi, for at least one i= 1, 2 (50b) becomes sufficient for (19). We are now in a position to state and prove the following theorem. Theorem 3: Let (47) hold for i = 1, 2, and (50a), (50b) hold for at least one i. Then, the quadratic Gaussian decision problem formulated in this section admits a unique stable Nash equilibrium solution ( 21 on quadratic Gaussian games to the case when a common probability space does not exist and the decision spaces are not necessarily finite dimensional, and shows that the appealing linear structure prevails when there exists a discrepancy in the perceptions of the two DM's of the underlying probability measures. The existence and uniqueness conditions here are, however, more restrictive than those of [8] , and also involve the probabilistic structure [see (50b)l. Expression (21a) in the most general case (and (49) for the special Gaussian case) is not uniformly (in yi) bounded by 1, unless si&) = g'(yj) = 1 a.e. Pi,, and P{, (which corresponds to the case of equivalent probability measures), since R-N derivatives (if different from 1) will be both smaller and larger than unity on sets of nonzero measure. This then implies, in view of (47), and from (49), that q' 2 1, i = 1, 2, with the inequality being strict if Pi; is not equivalent to P$i for at least one i = 1, 2, j # i. In such a case, even in team problems, a stable equilibrium solution may not exist, particularly if I/q; < llDj&ll~ < 1 for at least one i = 1, 2; j # i. This indicates, in general, the presence of a strong coupling between probabilistic and deterministic elements of the problem in terms of existence conditions. However, if the discrepancy between perceptions of the DM'S on the probability measures (measured in terms of R-N derivatives) is sufficiently small, one would expect q; to be sufficiently close to unity, which ensures satisfaction of condition (50c) for a fairly general class of quadratic strictly convex Gaussian team problems (since, \\a,D;ll\l = \\Dj,D$lJ = p < 1, for such team problems). For further discussion on this point we refer the reader to [ 101.
0
In the statement of Theorem 1, the condition (47) places some severe restrictions on the second moments of the underlying distributions (in case a discrepancy exists), which may however be relaxed if we are willing to consider equilibrium policies in a more restricted space. More specifically, satisfaction of (47) ensures that regardless of what initial set of policies the DM's start J Y j YY; Yi yi the infinite recursion (15) with, every element of this series is well defined, and under (50a), (50b) it will converge to a unique limit which is linear; in other words, even if the DM'S start with nonlinear policies, the end result will be a linear equilibrium solution. The condition (47) is restrictive because we require (without imposing any constraints on the policy spaces) the series generated by (15) to be well defined even with nonlinear starting conditions. However, if we restrict the team agents to linear policies from the outset, under Gaussian distributions (and following the argument used in the proof of Theorem 1) elements of the series (15) will be well defined [without requiring (47)] and will converge to the equilibrium solution provided that (50a), (50b) hold for at least one i = 1, 2. This line of reasoning then leads to the following result which we give without a proof. 
provided that the terms on the right-hand side are positive (if not, then the inequalities will accordingly change direction). N l -~l ( p a b -c 2 ) ( p a 2 -c 2 ) / p 2 a 3 which is positive, in view of (53) and the initial hypothesis that la/ CI )) 1. Likewise, D2 is positive whenever 0 < e2 (( 1 and Ib/el ))
1. Furthermore, given ad, 0 < d < 1, we can always find E , and el, both in (0, l),-so that both (56a) and (56b) are satisfied whenever \dl < d. Hence, the conclusion is that when the deviations of the perceptions of the DM'S from the common Gaussian probability measures are incremental [and satisfying (54)], the linear equilibrium solution of the Gaussian scalar team problem retains its stability property (but, of course, at a different (possibly close, in norm) equilibrium point).
-i
Example 2: As a second illustration of Theorem 1, for infinitedimensional decision spaces, we consider here a class of stochastic Gaussian team problems defined in continuous time. Now, conditions (47a) and (50a) depend only on the probabilistic structure, and are therefore again given by (54) and ( 5 3 , respectively. For (50b), however, we have to obtain the counterpart of (56) (59W provided that the terms on the right-hand side are positive, where X is defined by (58a), (58b).
Hence, under (54) and either (55a) and (59a) or (55b) and (59b), the continuous-time static decision problem formulated (ec/ab)X < 1 where X is defined by (58b).
C. Asymmetric Mode of Decision Making
To obtain the counterpart of the results of Section V-B under the asymmetric mode of decision making, we f m t investigate the possibility for the unique solution of Theorem 2 to be linear. Towards this end we first observe that the decision problem will admit a uniaue linear solution if, and only if, (31) This then leads to the following proposition. Proposition 6: Let (47) and Condition 3 be satisfied, and either P,;, # P:, or Ph # Pk. Then, the quadratic Gaussian decision probIem with asymmetric mode of decision making admits a linear ( 
0
The conditions of Proposition 6 are clearly nonvoid because, given the unique solution of (65a), it may be possible to find F$, E , Si2, and Si2 so that (65b) is satisfied. However, it should also be clear that satisfaction of (65b) places some severe restrictions on the parameters of the problem, which in general will not be met. Hence, it is fair to say that if either Pf, # P:, or PJ2 # P;2, generically the problem does not admit a linear equilibrium solution, even if it is a team problem; that is the following.
Corollary 5: If either Pf, # P;, or P:2 # P:2. (or both), the quadratic Gaussian decision problem does not admit (generically) a linear Stackelberg equilibrium solution. The unique solution, which exists under (47) and Condition 3, is nonlinear.
The conditions of the preceding corollary involve only the marginal distributions of y , and y2; in the compliment of these conditions we can derive the following linear solution.
Proposition 7: For the quadratic Gaussian decision problem, let both P-i,, = P,:, and P; = P& (but not necessarily PiIy2x 
Pro08
When PJ, = P& and Pit = P:2, g'QJ = g2Q2) = 1, and hence Conditions 1 and 2 of Thmrem 2 are always satisfied, and in Condition 3, p2 = p4 = 1 . Then, (66) is the counterpart of (39), and hence existence and uniqueness follow from Theorem 2. Linearity, on the other hand, follows by noting that if we start iteration (35) with ?lo) = 0, since gl(yl) = g2(yJ = 1 every term will be linear iny, [see also (64)], and hence the limit (which exists by Theorem 2 ) will be linear. Then, substituting y 'Ql) = Ay, in (31), we obtain (67b), by simply letting gl(y,) = g2Qz) = 1 in (64).
0
When there is a discrepancy between the DM's perceptions of the variances of either yI or y2, Proposition 7 will not hold, and the problem will admit (generically) a nonlinear equilibrium solution, as proven earlier in Proposition 6 and Corollary 5. In this case, an explicit closed-form solution cannot be obtained; however, an approximate solution can be derived by using the iteration (35) 
(68)
If we start this iteration with y(0)(yI) = 0, or any l i n e a r function of y , , at every iteration we obtain linear combinations of terms of the type (Ack)yl and B(k)yl exp { -1/2yfflk)yl), where A ( k ) and are linear operators, and V(&) 2 0 is an rn, X m, matrix. Since this is a successive approximation technique under Condition 3, even stopping the iteration after a finite number of terms will provide a solution sufficiently close to the unique optimum. Hence, generically, a suboptimal policy for DM1, which is sufficiently close to the unique solution of (31), will be of the form where N is a sufficiently large integer [related to the number of iterations taken in (68)], and A(.%?, B(0, I/co are generated via the iteration (68). Note that as N --t 03 this solution will uniformly converge to the unique optimum.
Yet another suboptimal solution can be obtained by restricting DMl's policies, at the outset, to linear functions ofy,, i.e., to the form (62) where A is a variable linear operator. DM2's response to any such policy will also be linear (in yz), thus making T2 in (10) a linear operator. Then, the problem faced by DM1 is minimization of (1 l), with rQ1) = A y , , over all linear bounded operators A . The solution of this minimization problem will provide DM1 with a linear policy that is (in general) inferior to the limiting solution of (68), unless, of course, g1Ql) = g2Qz) = 1 in which case the two solutions will be the same [satisfying (67b)l. We do not pursue here the details of the derivation of the best linear solution for the general case (as outlined above).
Furthermore, it is possible to work out the various conditions for the special cases of the scalar and continuous-time team problems (formulated as in Examples 1 and 2) and write down the equilibrium solution explicitly whenever it is linear. Such an analysis would rodinely follow the lines of the discussion of Examples 1 and 2, and hence will not be included here mainly because of space limitations.
VI. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS, AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
In the preceding sections, we have developed an equilibrium theory for two-person quadratic decision problems with static information patterns, wherein the decision makers (DM'S) do not necessarily have the same perception of the underlying probability space; that is, our formulation allows for discrepancies in the way different DM's perceive the probability space. As indicated earlier, when such discrepancies exist, even team problems have to be analyzed in the framework of nonzero-sum stochastic games, and in such a framework the Nash solution concept is the most suitable equilibrium concept if the DM's occupy symmetric (nonhierarchical) positions in the decision process, and the Stackelbeg solution concept becomes more meaningful if there is a hierarchy in decision making.
Section I11 of the paper has provided a set of sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric mode of decision making, with the additional feature that it be stable. This is an appealing feature of the solution because, in order to arrive at equilibrium (as a consequence of an infinite number of response iterations), each DM does not have to know the subjective probability measures perceived by the other DM, but has to know only the policy adopted by the other DM at the most recent step of the iteration.
In Section IV we have presented a counterpart of the results of Section 111 under the asymmetric mode of decision making. The conditions derived ensure that the equilibrium policy of the leader can be obtained as the limit of an infinite sequence which involves conditional expectations under two different probability measures. This sequence [(35), (27) ] is structurally different from its counterpart in Section Iu (see 14) , even for team problems, and it contains R-N derivatives of the two probability measures as multiplying factors [which are absent in (14)J.
In Section V we have shown that when the underlying probability distributions belong to a Gaussian class, the Nash equilibrium solution will be linear (affine, if mean values are nonzero) in the available static measurements, with the gain operator satisfying a Lyapunov-type operator equation (cf. Theorem 3). This solution and the associated existence conditions have been studied further in the context of two examples which involve scalar and continuous-time stochastic team problems with multiple probability models. In developing a counterpart of Theorem 3 for asymmetric mode of decision making, we have arrived at a seemingly surprising (unexpected) result-the unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution being generically nonlinear in the measurements (even under Gaussian multiple probability measures). This constitutes the first unique nonlinear solution reported in the literature for a quadratic Gaussian static game or team problem. It should be noted that we have not given a closed-form expression for this nonlinear solution, but have instead provided a recursive scheme which generates admissible policies that come arbitrarily close to the optimum solution.
Several extensions of the results presented in this paper seem to be possible. First, we should note that the general Hilbert-space framework adopted in this paper and the general solutions presented for the Gaussian problems in Section V (Theorems 3 and 4) apply to other models also, such as the ones similar to the continous-time team problem treated in [9] and the Stackelberg prcblem of 1261, but with the DM's having different probability models. It is expected that some explicit results (closed-form solutions) can also be obtained in these cases, but this point has not been pursued in this paper and is left for future research.
Another possible extension of the results of this paper would be to the class of problems in which the random state of nature (Le., x) as well as the measurements (yi) are stochastic processes. The general theories of Section III and IV could easily be extended so as to encompass this class of problems also, provided that the problem is set up under the right mathematical assumptions. In particular, if the random variables are taken to be Hilbert space valued weak random variables, with the inner product satisfying some continuity and boundedness conditions [ 1 I], Theorems 1 4 directly apply to this more general class of decision problems, when interpreted in the right framework. Furthermore, extension to dynamic (multistage) problems is also possible, by adopting the framework of (say) [SI for the linear-quadratic-Gaussian problem. Then, the unique Nash equilibrium solution under the onestep-delay observation sharing pattern can be obtained by basically following the approach of [8] and utilizing in the recursive derivation Theorem 3 of this paper instead of [8, Theorem 21.
Details of this derivation are, however, rather involved, and will be reported elsewhere.
Regarding the Nash equilibrium solution, yet another possible extension would be to multiple decision-maker problems with more tkan two (say, N) DM'S. Even though the definition of Nash equilibrium (cf. Definition 1) admits a natural (unique) extension to such problems, that of stable equilibrium (cf. Definition 2) does not extend in a unique way. One viable alternative is to assume that each DM reacts optimally to the set of most recent policies of all the other DM'S, which leads to a set of N relations similar to (9). In this case, (12) will be replaced by N equations with the right-hand side expressions involving N-1 policies of different DM's. However, the line of reasoning that took us from (13) to (14) does not have a counterpart if N > 2, and in general it is not possible to obtain N recursion relations each of which involves on/y one DM'S policies at consecutive stages. Then, the counterpart of (13) will have to be treated as a "multivalued" operator equation, in which context an existence and uniqueness result will have to be established. This seems to be a challenging problem whose solution requires somewhat different mathematical techiques than the ones employed in this paper.
One source of motivation for the research reported in this paper has been (as discussed in Section I) the desire to investigate the sensitivity and robustness of team-optimal solutions (in stochastic teams) to independent variations in the perceptions of the DM'S of the underlying probability space (and, in particular, the probability measure). The analysis of this paper indeed provides a framework for such a study when the roles of the DM'S are either symmetric or asymmetric, since an equilibrium theory has been established in both cases within an "E-neighborhood" of the teamoptimal solution. Some further work is needed in order to quadratic Gaussian nonzero-sum games, but there the nonlinear solution is one Reference [ 121 also reports on existence of nonlinear (Nash) solutions for of many solutions one of which is linear, and is due to nonunique intersection of rextion functions (which disappears under appropriate conditions).
determine the "satisfiability" of the several existence conditions obtained in the paper when the region of interest is an Eneighborhood of a common probability space, and to further extend the analysis to an investigation of sensitivity and robustness properties of team solutions (obtained under the stipulation of existence of a common underlying probability space) in this Eneighborhood. An aspect of the decision problem studied here, which is worth bringing forth, is that the subjective probability measures perceived by each DM is fixed in advance and the DM's do aot attempt to change their subjective priors during the course of the decision process. Hence, in this sense, the problem treated here is categorically different from the class of problems treated in [ 181-[21] . where the objective was for the DM's to arrive at a common (consistent) set of probabilistic descriptions of the unknown variables. In the symmetric mode, there is. however, an implicit learning process built in the recursive process that leads to the stable equilibrium decision rules for each DM. since the DM's do not necessarily have access to each other's perception of the priors. I Yet another aspect of the problem treated in this paper is that the general formulation could be viewed as a multimodeling in multiple decision maker problems; however. as opposed to the singular perturbations approach of where rn is a (yl, y2)-measurable random variable taking values in U,; hence, the subindex "2" indicates that the probability space is the one determined by the subjective probability measure of DM2. Now, the latter bound can further be bounded above by which completes the proof.
0 where gi( e ) are given by (2).
B W : M U L T P E E O N DECISION MAKLNG
Proof: The proof follows from the following set of equalities where we are allowed to change orders of integration because U1 and c U 2 are Hilbert spaces of random variables well defined under both measures: 131 where, in the next to the last line, we have used continuity property of inner product in pulling out P$l I,(dyl I[). Now, pulling the integration over Y2 into the inner product, we further obtain = J,, P:., (dtl) [h(v) where y2 E r2 is uniquely defined for each y , E rl by Y~= P~( Y J in r2.
(E-2)
Now, let (yT, y3 E TI x r2 be a Stackelberg solution to the original decision problem with the unique mapping T2 satisfying (10). Note that T2 E U2, and hence relabsling T2 as Pg and 7: as in (10) and (1 l), we obtain in view of (E-l), (E-2) -m i , P 5 2 ) J I ( P I . Pi) vaIE%l J2GBI. PS2)5J2u3l3 P 2 ) V U 1 , 82)EQl x%, which clearly indicate that (04, Pg E ' %I X a2 is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. This is, in fact, a stronger equilibrium (called "strong equilibrium" [ 171) because the second inequality is satisfied not only for 0, = of, but for all PI E CU2.
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